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After the Big Deals Are Done
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been able to reduce our expenditures with the
publishers when needed. The important point
is that we can do so much more easily now.
Negotiations have not been adversely affected by our departures. Publishers still, and
always will, want as much of our (and your)
budget as they can get, and will negotiate to
achieve that. This is why, contrary to what may
seem obvious, we have for the most part been
able to negotiate lower increases than what we
had when we were in the Big Deals.
The advantages to not participating in
Big Deals are clear. How to explain their
resiliency? Most institutions are not so flush
with funding that the costs of Big Deals, as
described above, are avoided.
The value must be assumed to be worth
those costs.
The appeal of Big Deals appears obvious:
access to journals not otherwise available. The
value also appears obvious, as most frequently
shown by download numbers. We too were
susceptible to the appeal, and impressed by
the apparent value, of our Deals. When we
looked more closely, which we were forced
to do because the faulty premise of the model
became more and more exposed, the lush landscape of plenty looked more like a mirage, and
the numbers were printed on a house of cards.
Assessment of resources relies heavily on
the number of downloads and a Cost Per Use
calculation. (These may or may not be the
only assessment components, but is anyone not
using them?) These metrics, particularly the
latter, can then be compared to those of other
resources. The higher the download numbers,
and the lower the Cost Per Use figure, the stronger the case for the Big Deal, or any resource.
Little attention is given to any interpretation
of the numbers. Downloads are taken at face
value as an objective criterion of assessment.
A download is a “good thing,” an accurate
indicator of demand. Further, downloads are
downloads, and it is assumed that there is
no difference between a download from one

publisher, vendor, or resource compared to
another. Partly this is due to the success of the
Counter standards that have been developed,
which do achieve at least some consistency in
the reporting of resource use. Partly it is due
to the difficulty of tracing how downloaded
content is actually used.
There is a real need for the profession
to examine these assumptions more closely.
Much is riding on them, but serious examination of them has only occurred around the
edges. Our experience suggests that there are
significant flaws in these assumptions, and
that while download numbers are essential in
assessment, they do not contain any meaning in
and of themselves. A detailed description of the
evidence provided by our experience at SIUC
is outside the scope here, but is summarized
below (more information can be found in Nabe,
Jonathan and Fowler, David. “Leaving the
‘Big Deal’ … Five Years Later.” The Serials
Librarian 69, No. 1 (Jul 2015): 20-28. doi:10.
1080/0361526X.2015.1048037). For the sake
of brevity, the case of only one publisher is
discussed here, but the observations and trends
are applicable for the others as well.
Downloads of non-subscribed content alone
from this publisher amounted to 11,254 from
597 titles in the year before we ceased our
Big Deal. These are phenomenal numbers
that would seem to go a long way to justifying
the Deal. Closer examination revealed some
concerns, however. To begin with, 62% of
the non-subscribed titles had averaged less
than 12 downloads per year, and a full 10%
had received no downloads. By any measure,
these were not essential titles for the University.
Even more clarification was provided by
analysis conducted post-departure. We did
this analysis because we wanted to measure
the impact of our decisions; it was possible,
after all, that they had been the wrong ones.
The results indicated otherwise.
Downloads and the CPU calculations
derived from them can only work for paid
content. How do you assess the value of lost
content, or measure the impact of a decision
to end access to it? Requests via Interlibrary
loan for lost titles can serve as a proxy for

actual demand, and that is the method we have
used. Objections can be made that ILLs do
not fully represent all demand, either, since
researchers can use professional and personal
networks, individual subscriptions, open access
repositories or websites, etc., to get the content.
Download numbers over-report demand, ILL
requests under-report it. The real demand lies
somewhere in between, no one really knows
where. But in addition to serving as a corrective to the download numbers in the attempt to
measure demand and calculate value, analysis
of ILL requests in this context also fulfills a
practical need: it tells us the impact on library
operations, staff time and outlays, of leaving
Big Deals.
Again, for brevity’s sake details are provided for the single publisher used above. Briefly,
the annual number of ILL requests averages
2% of the pre-departure downloads of the
non-subscribed titles, over the five year period
post-departure. 47% percent of the lost titles
which had some downloads pre-departure have
not had any ILL requests. The average number
of ILL requests per title is less than two. There
has been no flood of requests for ILLs, putting
pressure on the staff, or spike in our costs,
putting pressure on our budget. While the
ratio of requests to downloads has increased
over the years — to be expected as additional
issues of the journals are published — it has
never reached a level that cannot be absorbed
by the library as part of its everyday workflow.
If any given title is shown by ILL requests to
warrant an individual subscription, swapping
for a lesser used title is always possible — but
has not been indicated to date.
What this analysis shows is that for us, Big
Deals were unaffordable overkill. Nice to have,
for public relation’s sake and for convenience’s
sake too. But they were not providing essential
content; on the contrary, they were forcing
us to cut essential resources, and would have
done so at an accelerating rate had we maintained them. Leaving them has not led us to
the brink of oblivion, it has just taken us back
to the place we all came from: a Library with
the subscriptions that the University needs and
that we can afford.

Doubling Down on the Big Deal in Wisconsin
by Doug Way (Associate University Librarian for Collections and Research Services at University of Wisconsin-Madison,
Memorial Library, 728 State Street, Madison, WI 53706; Phone: 608-265-5466) <doug.way@wisc.edu>

T

he University of Wisconsin-Madison
has a long history with the Big Deal.
In 2001 Ken Frazier, who at the time
was the University Librarian at UW-Madison,
wrote an article in D-Lib Magazine in which
he coined for the first time the phrase the “Big
Deal” as a way to describe journal publishers’
large-scale journal aggregations.1 In his article,
Frazier warned libraries against trading shortterm benefits for long-term consequences.
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The Big Deal, he warned, weakened library
collections with unwanted journals, increased
libraries’ dependence on publishers, reduced
budgetary flexibility, limited libraries’ ability
to influence the scholarly communications
system in the future, threatened serials vendors,
and placed limits on resource sharing. Frazier
said UW-Madison would take a principled
stance and hold out against the Big Deal. It
would license electronic access to only the

highest-used journal titles. It would keep
the rest of its journals in print, select journals
title-by-title, and continue to rely on resource
sharing for access to other content.
Four years later Frazier published another article on the Big Deal.2 In it he outlined
how UW-Madison was continuing to hold
out against the Big Deal, but was also faced
with both a difficult local budget situation
continued on page 24
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and escalating journal costs. These had led
to the systematic cancelation of journals with
“no end to the cutting in sight.”3 Life without
the Big Deal, according to Frazier, meant
not having the resources users needed and
“always having to say you are sorry to faculty
and researchers.”4 Within a few years of that
article the university had signed agreements
for two Big Deals.
A decade later the financial situation
Frazier had described at UW-Madison had
not improved. Over that time the Libraries’
collections budget had continued to stagnate,
losing nearly $4 million in buying power.
Journal cancelations continued to be the
norm, while the amount of money spent on
interlibrary loan (ILL) had expanded dramatically. Frazier was no longer the University
Librarian, but the Libraries still only had those
two Big Deals. This was partly a result of
UW-Madison’s principled stance against the
Big Deal. In many ways, however, the impact
of Frazier’s philosophy was secondary to
structural barriers that existed at the university
and the Libraries.
A decentralized administrative structure
for libraries at UW-Madison hindered any
move toward the acquisition of large journal
packages. The university’s General Library
System (GLS) consists of 16 of the larger
campus libraries, but there were nearly 25
additional libraries on campus. While campus
libraries cooperated on a variety of fronts, the
large number of independent actors made it
difficult to reach a consensus. Further exacerbating the problem was a historic desire
for each library to pay “their fair share.” If a
library was unable or unwilling to do so, this
had the ability to derail any collaborative collections efforts. Finally, a budgetary model in
the GLS that allocated collections funds at the
lowest possible fund-level hampered efforts to
make large central acquisitions like Big Deals.
I arrived at UW-Madison in 2014 and began to review the Libraries’ entire collections
program, including the journal packages the
university did and did not have. Through this
initial analysis it became very clear to me that
the library needed to take a closer look at journal packages from several publishers. That
subsequent analysis focused almost solely
on saving money, including an examination
of both inflation and ILL costs. The library
analyzed how much inflation it was seeing annually on existing subscriptions from specific
publishers and then used that data to create
projections for potential savings over time.
ILL borrowing and lending over time was
also analyzed to determine potential savings
and to project potential revenue. The goal
of this analysis was to identify at what point
these potential Big Deals would begin saving
UW-Madison money and how much those
savings would be over time. In the end, we
identified two Big Deals that had the potential
to provide significant and immediate savings.
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From the start I was very open and up front
as I discussed the benefits and downsides
of the Big Deals with selectors and campus
libraries staff. While publishers almost invariably talked about the “value” of the new content the library would be adding, I deliberately
downplayed that fact. It was felt that those
discussions could be a distraction from the
true focus, which was saving money. It was
true that this added content was key to achieving savings on ILL, but I was also cognizant of
philosophical concerns and arguments, such
as the one Frazier made, regarding how Big
Deals mix weak and strong titles together.
Overall, however, the obstacles that needed
to be overcome had to do almost exclusively with structural barriers rather
than philosophical concerns.
In working with non-GLS campus
libraries, the goal was to remove impediments to participation. The GLS
needed to abandon the “fairness”
approach and reassure these
libraries that it would
not cost them more
to participate. To do
that the GLS agreed to
pick up the additional
costs associated with
these Big Deals. In
these discussions, the
inflation control aspect of these packages
was promoted and the
libraries were provided information on how much money these
packages would be saving them over time.
For conversations with selectors the focus
was on the big picture. They were shown how
much money the libraries would be saving and
how this benefited them in the end. To fund
these Big Deals the Libraries were going to
move money allocated for journal subscriptions that were part of these packages from
selectors’ individual fund lines to a centralized
fund line. This would remove the ongoing
inflation burden from those funds for titles
that they could no longer cancel. While there
was some push back from some selectors, as
they were concerned that their funds were now
smaller, I explained that the appearance of the
bigger budget was a façade, as they would
have no control over many of those titles.
After laying the groundwork for several
months, the addition of the two new Big Deals
ended up being a non-issue. Being up front
about the positive and negative aspects of
these Big Deals demonstrated an awareness
of the philosophical concerns surrounding
them. Likewise, by providing comprehensive
data, abandoning the “fairness” principle and
centralizing the funding of Big Deals the
Libraries were able to overcome structural
barriers it faced. Finally, by articulating a
succinct goal and using a thorough analysis to
illustrate how that goal could be achieved, the
Libraries were able to develop strong buy-in.
And in the end, both packages acquired actually ended up saving the Libraries even more
money in the first year than initially projected.

Now that the Libraries have doubled the
number of Big Deals at our university, does
this mean UW-Madison is a fan of the Big
Deal? In a word, no. Many of the concerns
that Frazier outlined fifteen years ago still
exist. Big Deals do bundle “weak” journals
with the “strong.” But libraries have found
that “weak” journals often see greater use
than “strong” journals. Big Deals do limit
budgetary flexibility. UW-Madison has seen
a decrease in spending on monographs that is,
in part, directly related to additional spending on journals. At the same time, however,
UW-Madison has transformed into a campus with a heavy STEM focus and perhaps
the shift toward those
kinds of resources is
both inevitable and a
sign that the Libraries
are changing with the
campus. Finally, Big
Deals do diminish the
role of serial vendors.
Certainly the instability in this marketplace,
as seen with the recent
SWETS bankruptcy,
can have negative impacts on libraries, but
one has to question
whether this is a valid
reason to avoid the Big
Deal.
Avoiding the Big
Deal at UW-Madison
did not solve the serials crisis, nor did it end
up saving the university money. Journal publishing continues to exist in an environment
that is devoid of normal market controls,
and avoiding the Big Deal simply moved
costs from our collections budget to our
ILL budget. That doesn’t mean it was the
wrong choice. Over time philosophies and
approaches change. Interestingly, the biggest
barrier the Libraries faced was not that shift
in philosophy, but overcoming the structural
barriers and intransigence that existed locally. The decision to add these Big Deals was
based on practicality and saving money. If a
better option had existed the Libraries would
have gone down that road. UW-Madison,
like many libraries, chose the Big Deal not
because it was a wonderful model, but because
sometimes it is pragmatism and not principles
that wins the day.
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